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Smaller Scandinavian states are at a distinct disadvantage as a result of the current framework governing the Arctic. In order to better preserve their interests in the environment, the rights of their indigenous
groups, and their security interests, these states should lead the push to
develop a working group within the Arctic Council with a view toward the
creation of an Arctic treaty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The effort to secure sovereignty over continental shelves in the Arctic has at once been described as a “land grab,1 a “gold rush,”2 and, “a race
to claim Arctic resources.”3 Russia sparked this frenzy when it planted a
flag at the bottom of the Arctic seafloor in 2007, claiming a vast section of
the Arctic continental shelf as Russian territory.4 The event brought international attention to its prior 2001 claim to sovereignty over a large region of
the Arctic as part of a natural extension of Russian territory.5 Russia advanced this claim under the auspices of Article 76 of the United Nations
Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for review by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).6 In 2002, the CLCS
recommended Russia resubmit the claim with more supportive scientific
evidence.7
Such headlines paint the Arctic Circle as a lawless “wild west” in
which the “Arctic Five” (Russia, Canada, United States, Denmark, and
Norway) jockey for control over what is perhaps the world’s last remaining
unexplored and undeveloped frontier. The Arctic Five reject this notion,
insisting instead upon the need to arrive at, “[an] orderly settlement of any
possible overlapping claims” by adhering to international law, the existing
law of the sea framework, and remaining committed to working together
within international fora such as the Arctic Council.8
1

Jessa Gamble, Polar Meltdown Triggers International Arctic Landgrab, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=po
lar-meltdown-triggers-landgrab.
2
Paul Reynolds, The Arctic’s New Gold Rush, BBC (Oct. 25, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.u
k/2/hi/business/4354036.stm.
3
Doug Mellgren, Technology, Climate Change Spark Race to Claim Arctic Resources,
USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2007-03-24-arcticbon
anza_N.htm.
4
Russia Plants Flag Under N Pole, BBC (Aug. 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/euro
pe/6927395.stm (noting Russia’s flag plant in 2007 and suggesting the stunt was intended to
bring attention to its 2001 claim).
5
Id.
6
See Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, COMM’N ON THE LIMITS OF
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission
_submissions.htm (stating Russia’s submission date in December of 2001).
7
See U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 38–41, U.N. Doc.
A/57/57/Add. 1 (October 8, 2002) (summarizing the findings of the CLCS, and recommending that Russia revise and resubmit its claim regarding the Central Arctic Ocean).
8
Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362. At this meeting, hosted by Denmark, several relevant actors represented within the Arctic Council were notably not invited
to participate, including Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and all of the indigenous constituencies
which enjoy “permanent participant” status on the Council. Id.
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The current international legal framework is ill-equipped to settle
conflicting continental shelf claims and ensure that each state’s interests,
particularly those of smaller Scandinavian states, are fully respected.9 The
present Note therefore examines this legal framework governing the Arctic
from a Scandinavian perspective. To that end, the Note will first provide
background on various motivations and interests at stake for establishing
sovereignty over an extended continental shelf in light of environmental
concerns, explore the existing mechanism for resolving overlapping continental shelf disputes under UNCLOS, and identify some of the particular
disputes in which the interests of Scandinavian states may be at risk. Next,
the Note further examines some of the key national interests of Scandinavian states, and suggests that the mechanism for resolving claims to an extended continental shelf in the Arctic is insufficient, on its own, to protect
these interests. Finally, the Note argues that Scandinavian states should lead
the effort to strengthen the Arctic Council and recommends modifications
by which to accomplish this objective.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Motivations for Staking a Claim vs. Environmental Risks

The Arctic Five seek to establish sovereignty over and extend their
continental shelves despite environmental risk. A primary motivation for the
Arctic Five to do so is the perceived economic development prospects of oil
and natural gas resources; for as much as, “90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids
may remain to be found in the Arctic.”10 Advancements in offshore oil and
gas extraction technologies render these opportunities possible.11 Nevertheless, harsh Arctic conditions pose significant obstacles to the extraction of
these resources and increase the risk of disastrous oil spills.12 Icy conditions
9

Throughout this note “Scandinavian states” will be used to refer to the group of states
that collectively represent themselves as such, including Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
However, emphasis will be placed on the states of Denmark and Norway as these states have
tangible claims to the continental shelf. “Nordic states” will be used to refer collectively to
the states of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland.
10
KENNETH BIRD ET. AL, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RES. APPRAISAL ASSESSMENT TEAM, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED
OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 1 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/20
08/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
11
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, TECHNOLOGY IN THE ARCTIC 2 (2010), available at http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/innovation/downloads/arctic/technology_in_the_arctic.pdf (commenting on advances in oil and gas exploration and production technologies).
12
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, OIL SPILL RESPONSE CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC WATERS 3 (2007);
see also Kristin Noelle Casper, Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: Softening of Ice
Demands Hardening of International Law, 49 NAT. RES. J. 825, 832–34 (2009) (summariz-
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inhibit the ability to clean up and effectively respond to such a spill. 13 For
example, oil trapped beneath ice takes much longer to naturally biodegrade
and mitigation strategies such the use of dispersants and in-situ burning are
ineffective under such conditions.14
Environmental degradation of the ozone layer via global climate
change is also influencing the motivation to establish sovereignty and complicating the balance between environment and industry. Scientists predict
ice free summers in the Arctic by the year 2030.15 Freeing up shipping lanes
in the Arctic year-round would still be impossible due to the unsuitable winter conditions.16 However, establishing sovereignty over an extended continental shelf is now a forward looking approach for Arctic states. This is
especially true given that expanded shipping lanes such as the Northern Sea
Route and Northwest Passage reduce the time and cost necessary to deliver
oil, gas, and other resources, and can provide substantial benefits to the state
that controls regulation of its use.17 Moreover, technological improvements
in the ability of icebreakers to handle this terrain suggest that this possibility
could eventually become viable for the long term.18 This increase in shipping traffic will include large icebreaking vessels which destroy and break
apart the ice and further influence climate change by releasing carbon emis-

ing the detrimental impacts of oil and gas exploration and exploitation at each stage of the
process).
13
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 12, at 7–9, 27 (WWF advises against any further oil
and gas exploration in the Arctic until this “response gap” can be closed). In addition to the
problems presented by the “response gap,” stopping a leak at an extraction site, as attempted
in the recent British Petroleum crisis in the Gulf of Mexico, is exponentially more difficult to
do in a frigid Arctic environment. Challenges unique to oil spill response in the Arctic include sea ice, wind, temperature, limited visibility, and sea state. Id. at 15–19; see also Elizabeth Weise & Doyle Rice, How Bad Could BP Oil Spill Get for the Gulf and the Nation?
USA TODAY, June 9, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2010-06-091Aoilhowbad09_CV_N.htm (describing the difficulties associated with oil spill response in
the Gulf of Mexico).
14
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 12, at 7, 16.
15
Arctic Ice Could be Gone by 2030, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.telegra
ph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/8005620/Arctic-ice-could-be-gone-by-2030.html.
16
The Arctic Council maintains that shipping in the region will continue to remain seasonal. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 86 (2009).
17
See Id. at 115–17 (discussing fees charged by Russia with respect to passage through
the Northern Sea Route). The Arctic Council does not predict the Northwest Passage to become a viable shipping route until after 2020, but does note that destinational shipping along
this route is expected to increase. Id. at 5. The transport of oil and gas via the Northern Sea
Route is predicted to reach as high as 40 million tons a year by 2020. Id.
18
See Norway: Double-acting Ships Make Arctic Oil Export Routes Competitive, WORLD
OIL, Apr. 1, 2001 (describing advances in icebreaker technology, particularly “oblique icebreakers” which have been developed to break through heavy ice ridging during the winter in
the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland).
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sions and other contaminants into the Arctic marine environment.19 The
Arctic cruise tourism industry represents another economic motivator for
the Arctic Five, while at the same time contributing to an increase in ship
traffic and presenting additional environmental risks to Arctic marine life.20
Climate change also impacts the Arctic fishing industry. Fish stocks
in Arctic waters respond by altering their migratory routes.21 As fishing
seasons grow longer due to summer Arctic ice melt and fish head farther
north to international waters, this natural resource will become increasingly
vulnerable to over-exploitation.22 Though the extension of a state’s continental shelf under UNCLOS would not award any additional rights to the
exploitation of fish present in such waters, economic and environmental
considerations are still of concern to Arctic states. Conflicting resource
management strategies are at the center of the struggle to maintain a balance
between preservation of the marine environment and sustaining local economies and domestic industries.23
B.

UNCLOS and Sovereignty

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
governs the relationships between states seeking to “stake a claim” to the
Arctic continental shelf. UNCLOS governs both the procedural mechanisms
19
The Arctic Council has acknowledged these environmental impacts as having potentially detrimental consequences, as the destruction of the ice impacts Arctic residents dependent
on over-ice travel, and an increase in the release of pollutants may require new IMO regulations. ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 5.
20
See, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, CRUISE TOURISM ON SVALBARD: A RISKY BUSINESS?
3–4 (2004) (noting that this industry has grown steadily in popularity among tourists, while
increasing the chances for an oil spill, contributing to Arctic pollution, and potentially exposing otherwise pristine Arctic environments to such contaminants and risks).
21
Recognizing that climate change may impact the migration routes of fish stocks, the
Arctic Council claims these stocks have always been affected by fluctuation in climate and
circumstances. However, the Arctic Council acknowledges that this does not mitigate the fact
that changes in the migratory patterns of fish stocks lead to conflicts between states over how
this resource should be managed. The Arctic Council recommends a precautionary approach
to such management. See Hjalmar Vilhjalmsson & Alf Hakon Hoel, et.al, Fisheries and
Aquaculture, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 706–07 (2005).
22
See E. CARINA H. KESKITALO, CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE ARCTIC:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 174 (2008) (discussing impact
of climate change on salmon); see also Climate Change Extends Arctic Fishing, CBC NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2010/10/25/arctic-climate-change-baff
in-fisheries.html (noting impact of climate change on fishing industry off the northern coast
of Baffin Island).
23
For example, Norway and Russia have conflicted over this issue, and even when these
two states were able to reach an agreement, other states can intervene and weaken such bilateral arrangements when fish move to international waters. Vilhjalmmson et al., supra note
21, at 707.
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for the assertion of such claims and the substantive determinations of existing maritime boundary lines.24 With regard to the latter, maritime boundaries consist of four zones: a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf.25
Beyond the 200 nautical mile mark of the EEZ, a state must submit
formal claims founded upon scientific evidence to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in order to demonstrate that its continental shelf is a natural extension of its territory.26 States must submit such
a claim within 10 years of the entry into force of UNCLOS for that State.27
These claims may extend from the same baseline used to measure the territorial sea up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles.28
Where a state successfully establishes a claim over its continental
shelf, Article 77 of UNCLOS provides: “The coastal State exercises over
the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources.”29 In contrast to a state’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, and EEZ, a state’s sovereign rights over its continental shelf
are limited to only the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.
Unlike Article 56 (describing a state’s sovereign rights on the EEZ), Article
77 does not address the exclusive right to the protection and preservation of

24

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. Despite the media portrayal of the Arctic as a lawless wild west,
there is a legal mechanism for establishing a claim under UNCLOS. Articles 2, 3, and 33 of
UNCLOS pertain to the setting of maritime boundaries, whereas Article 76 pertains to the
delimitation of the continental shelf. Id. While the United States has not yet ratified
UNCLOS, it observes the demarcation of zones promulgated by UNCLOS as part of international customary law. Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark have all signed and ratified
UNCLOS. Id. The issue of whether or not the United States may participate in submitting a
claim is beyond the scope of this Note.
25
A state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles measured from its baseline, and states
may exercise complete sovereignty in this zone. Id. art. 2–3. The only limitation upon a
state’s sovereignty in this zone is that it must afford other states the right to innocent passage.
Between 12 and 24 nautical miles is the contiguous zone, in which states may prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations, as well as pursue any violations of these laws committed within the territorial sea. Id. art. 33. In the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends to 200 nautical miles, states maintain the sovereign right to exploration and exploitation, conservation, and management of natural resources and jurisdiction over the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Id.
art. 56–57.
26
Id. art. 76.
27
Id. annex II, art. 4. Respectively, Denmark therefore has until 2014 to submit its claim
and Canada until 2013. Russia plans to resubmit its claim in 2014. Russia Uses New Research Data to Enhance Arctic Territorial Claim, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 13, 2010), http://en.ria
n.ru/russia/20101113/161323182.html.
28
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76.
29
Id. art. 77.
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the marine environment on the continental shelf.30 The omission of this language from Article 77 therefore leaves uncertainty as to what series of international environmental legal frameworks will apply to newly extended
continental shelves in terms of conservation and protection of the marine
environment.31 This uncertainty increases as a result of the conflicting development and resource management approaches taken by the various
members of the Arctic Five (a subject of further examination in Section III
of this Note).
C.

Deficiencies in CLCS Procedure

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a
scientific commission comprised of 21 members selected on the basis of
equitable geographical representation. The CLCS advances recommendations as to where states should draw their boundary lines based upon a scientific analysis of a state’s claim, with reference to their expertise in geology, geophysics, and hydrography.32 As a scientific body, the CLCS does not
have the authority to rule on a state’s legal interpretation of UNCLOS, however, there are multiple permissible methods under Article 76 for calculating
and measuring the outer limits of the continental shelf.33 A submitting state
can choose whichever method is most advantageous to its interests, and can
even alternate between methods in one submission to make the most of a
claim.34
30
Compare UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 56 (“In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal
State has…(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with
regard to…(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment”), with UNCLOS,
supra note 24, art. 77 (“The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.”).
31
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 77. The right of a state to exploration and exploitation of
natural resources on its continental shelf is exclusive in the sense that no one may develop
such resources without consent of the sovereign state. However, mention of the responsibility
for natural resource management is notably absent from this article. Id.
32
Id. art. 76, para. 8 and annex II; Members of the Commission, CLCS (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members.htm#Members. Norway and
Russia are the only states with claims to the Arctic continental shelf currently represented on
the CLCS. Id.
33
These two methods include the Irish, or Gardiner formula, and the Hedberg formula.
Both methods involve a reference point, known as the “foot of the slope,” the point at which
the continental shelf drops off and the deep ocean floor begins. The Gardiner formula uses
geological analysis of the foot of the slope to establish the outermost fixed points at which
the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least one percent of the shortest distance to the foot
of the slope. In contrast, the Hedberg formula uses hydrographical or geomorphological
criteria to establish the outermost fixed points. Kristin Bartenstein, Flag-Planting, 65 INT’L J.
187, 194–95 (2009).
34
Id. at 196 (noting that these scientific methods can be alternated within the same submission as Norway did in 2006).

File: Traner 2

2011]

Created on: 1/21/2012 6:47:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:41:00 PM

RESOLVING ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

505

In addition to these problems, there are crucial ambiguities surrounding the terms “submarine elevations” and “submarine ridges,” which
states may exploit to claim sovereignty beyond the 350 nautical mile limit.35
Furthermore, the CLCS’s proceedings lack transparency, such that states
cannot rely on CLCS precedent when developing claims.36 States seeking to
submit a claim must conduct expensive, time consuming research with very
little guidance, only to run the risk of being required to resubmit the claim. 37
This process therefore provides very little incentive among states to cooperate. States with the necessary financial means and expertise to conduct Arctic continental shelf research derive no benefit from sharing or cooperating
in gathering such information with other states.38 Finally, while UNCLOS
stipulates that the CLCS recommendations are “final and binding,”39 it is
ultimately for the submitting state to declare its own boundary line, to which
it will be required to adhere.40
D.

Resolving Simultaneous Conflicting Claims to the Continental Shelf

The CLCS has no mechanism for resolving two simultaneously
submitted scientifically accurate yet conflicting claims. States must therefore turn to the other provisions of UNCLOS for assistance when attempting
to resolve continental shelf disputes. Article 279 of UNCLOS obligates
states to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner.41 If states cannot agree, they
may submit the dispute to either the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or one of two arbitral tribunals.42

35
Id. at 196–97 (Submarine ridges are subject to the 350 nautical mile limit. Submarine
elevations that are “natural components of the continental margin” are not, and it is quite
difficult to distinguish between the two, both physically and according to the language of
UNCLOS.); see also UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76.
36
Tavis Potts & Clive Schofield, Current Legal Developments in the Arctic, 23 INT’L J.
MARINE AND COASTAL L. 151, 165–67 (2008) (CLCS proceedings are conducted in secret to
protect the confidentiality of the submitting state’s methods).
37
Id. at 166. For example, Russia was asked by the CLCS to resubmit its claim with more
scientific evidence in 2002. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
38
Potts & Schofield, supra note 36, at 167. While Potts and Schofield suggest cooperation
may be beneficial for states, it has not politically materialized. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
39
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 76, para. 8.
40
Bartenstein, supra note 33, at 193 (stating that the state will be bound by its own pronouncement of the extent of its boundary).
41
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 279.
42
Id. art. 287, para. 1 (explaining that states may choose any of these forums upon signing, ratifying or acceding to UNLCOS, or anytime thereafter by specifying in a written declaration).
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When states involved in a dispute have elected different forums,
UNCLOS generally requires the use of arbitration, unless the parties otherwise reach an agreement.43 The Arctic Five have all selected different forums by written declaration.44 However, Arctic continental shelf disputes
may be advanced pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS, which provides that
states may reject all dispute resolution mechanisms as to boundary delimitation.45 This exception will provide the opportunity for Arctic states to deny
to be bound by any tribunal if the dispute involves the delimitation of the
continental shelf.46 Therefore, the only recourse the Arctic states will be left
with to resolve conflicting continental shelf disputes is international diplomacy and negotiation.47
E.

Challenges to Resolution by Diplomacy

The CLCS process affords the Arctic members of UNCLOS the ultimate respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity by allowing them
43
Id. art 287, para. 5. States party to UNCLOS that have selected different forums may
submit to arbitration unless they otherwise agree, but are not required to do so. However,
Article 288 states that one of these forums must have jurisdiction over disputes arising under
UNCLOS. Thus when reading Articles 287 and 288 in conjunction, arbitration is the fallback
forum. See id. art. 288.
44
Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9
CHI. J. INT’L. L. 323, 336 n.102 (2008) (citing U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF
THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND TO THE
AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, at 98–101, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1996)).
Canada elected to resolve disputes in the International Court of Justice or by special arbitration under Annex VII. Denmark and Norway elected the International
Court of Justice. Russia elected arbitration under Annex VII, except for disputes
related to fisheries, the environment, scientific research, and navigation, for which
it elected arbitration under Annex VII; and disputes related to detained vessels and
crews, for which it elected the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
Id. Again, the subject of whether or not the United States may submit a claim at all under
UNCLOS is outside the scope of this Note. However, States that accept provisions of
UNCLOS as customary international law—as the U.S. has—may be subject to ICJ jurisdiction. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Environment and Trade: Competing Paradigms in International Law, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 543, 549 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess, eds., 1998) but
see infra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that lack of standing may be a challenge
necessary to overcome even for states party to UNCLOS).
45
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 298 (permitting states to opt out of any of the suggested
forums when a dispute relates to boundary delimitation.)
46
Holmes, supra note 44, at 336–37 (Canada, Denmark, and Russia all opted not to be
bound by any tribunal for disputes involving boundary delimitation via Article 298 of
UNCLOS).
47
UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 279 (Obliging states to resolve their disputes peacefully).
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to resolve disputes regarding the extension of continental shelves via international diplomacy. Yet with respect to the Arctic, this serves as a significant advantage for geopolitically well-positioned states, such as Canada and
Russia, to the disadvantage of smaller Scandinavian states, such as Denmark and Norway.48 Moreover, bargaining away the Arctic in this manner
leaves uncertainty as to how and which international environmental regulations will apply to the newly expanded boundary lines.49 Some of the Scandinavian states’ interests, such as environmental policies, the rights of their
respective indigenous peoples, and security concerns will not be secured as
a result of this process.

48

See Nikolaj Petersen, The Arctic as a New Arena for Danish Foreign Policy: The Ilulissat Initiative and its Implications, DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 35, 44–48 (2009)
(noting that Russia stands the most to gain in seeking to re-establish its former superpower
status and is increasing its Arctic military capacities; Canada has also increased such military
capabilities).
49
See Casper, supra note 12, at 865–66 (“There is no consensus in the legal/academic
community as to what the existing arrangements are and if they can provide sufficient protection for the Arctic.”).
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III. INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND PROTECTION OF SCANDINAVIAN
INTERESTS
A.

Disputes in Which the Interests of Scandinavian States May Be at
Risk

1.

Lomonosov Ridge dispute

50

Denmark, Canada, and Russia will soon be faced with the problem
of resolving a dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge because the CLCS process provides no mechanism for resolving simultaneously submitted conflicting claims.51 Though Canada and Denmark have been cooperating in
the data collection process, these states still send their own national scientists and maintain their own national programs.52 Russia is not a part of this
50
Richard Galpin, The Struggle for Arctic Riches, BBC (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-11381773 (edited by author to improve clarity in reprint).
51
The choice of different dispute resolution forums and the rejection of any tribunal by
Canada, Denmark, and Russia leave this dispute without a forum. See supra notes 44–46 and
accompanying text.
52
See Danish-Canadian Bathymetric and Gravimetric Survey of the Arctic Ocean,
CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2009), http://a76.dk/cgi-bin/nyheder-m-m.cgi?id=123
7357596|cgifunction=form (describing these operations as “part of the Danish and Canadian
national UNCLOS programmes” and stating, “the UNCLOS programme is in Denmark
managed by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), and in Canada by
the Geological Survey of Canada (GCS) and the Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS)”).
But see DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 53 (Nanna
Hvidt & Hans Mouritzen, eds., 2009) (noting Danish-Canadian cooperation).
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process, and has its own data collection team.53 Thus, even if Canada and
Denmark submit a joint claim, it is still likely to directly conflict with Russia’s.
In the event that Russia or Canada pronounce an aggressive claim
or boundary line based upon their interpretation of the CLCS scientific recommendations, Denmark will seek to challenge such a claim before the
ICJ.54 Denmark may be able to challenge a claim made by Canada since
Canada and Denmark have elected the same forum, but Russia cannot be
drawn in, nor can arbitration serve as a fallback mechanism.55 Notwithstanding this problem, there is still a possibility that Denmark may lack
standing to challenge both the boundary pronouncements of Russia and
Canada based upon the CLCS’s recommendations.56 The only recourse
Denmark could be left with is international diplomacy and negotiation,
which, as the next scenario illustrates, still may not meet a small Scandinavian state’s needs and interests, and leaves open the potential for exploitation.
2.

Norway-Russia Treaty

On September 15, 2010, Norway and Russia signed a treaty resolving their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea via international diplomacy.57
53

Russia claims it invested $50 million in researching its continental shelf claim in 2010.
Russia, Canada Back Science to Resolve Dispute Over Arctic Claims (Update 1), RIA
NOVOSTI, Sept. 16, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20100916/160615112.html.
54
DECLARATIONS OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK TO UNCLOS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Vol. III, pt. I, ch. XXI at 451, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (April 1, 2009) (noting Danish selection of the
ICJ as its venue for UNCLOS-related dispute resolution). See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (showing that Denmark and Canada chose the ICJ and Russia chose arbitration,
yet all three have rejected the arbitration procedures under Article 298 for boundary delimitation disputes).
55
Denmark and Canada chose the ICJ, Russia chose arbitration, and all three rejected
Article 298’s arbitration procedures for boundary delimitation disputes. Holmes, supra note
44, at 336–37.
56
See H.E. Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, President, Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Statement at the 73rd Biennial Conference of the International Law Association, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil: The Outer Continental Shelf: Some Considerations Concerning Applications
and the Potential Role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 12–15 (Aug. 21,
2008), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/
wolfrum/ila_rio_210808_eng.pdf (describing several difficulties associated with maintaining
standing in a continental shelf dispute).
57
Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean art. 1, Nor.Russ., Sept. 15, 2010, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/
avtale_engelsk.pdf [hereinafter Nor.-Russ. Treaty].
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58

While the treaty between Russia and Norway tends to indicate a
willingness to cooperate, Norway still faces some challenges and disadvantages as a result of this agreement that could prove detrimental to its
national interests.59 For example, under Article 4 of the treaty, the parties
have agreed to collaborate regarding fishing activities, applying a precautionary approach to conservation, management, and exploitation of straddling fish stocks.60 Yet the entire article regarding fisheries management is
vague and does not stipulate what may happen if either party over-exploits
migratory fish stocks or how such a dispute would be resolved in the event
of third party exploitation.61 In addition, while Article 5 of the treaty addresses hydrocarbon exploitation and stipulates that any trans-boundary
resources are to be developed jointly, it is silent as to how responsibility
should be apportioned in the event of an oil spill or accident. 62 Finally, the
rights of indigenous peoples of both Russia and Norway to exploit these
resources are not mentioned at all within this treaty.63
58
Russia and Norway Sign Maritime Border Agreement, BBC (Sept. 15, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11316430 (edited by author to improve clarity in reprint).
59
Nor.-Russ. Treaty, supra note 57, at pmbl.
60
Id art. 4.
61
Id.
62
Id. art. 5.
63
The Sami people inhabit the northernmost regions of Russia, Sweden, Finland, and
Norway. To supplement their traditional livelihood of reindeer herding, many work as full-
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Scandinavian Interests

The Scandinavian states maintain several key policy concerns in the
Arctic which are of critical national importance and are at odds with those
of other members of the Arctic Five. Specifically, the Scandinavian concerns include: (1) an approach to resource and environmental management
at odds with Russian development expectations, (2) an increased obligation
to respect the rights of indigenous peoples, particularly the Greenland Inuit
and the Sami, and, (3) a heightened security interest in ensuring denuclearization of the Arctic. Under the current international legal framework governing the Arctic, these interests are insufficiently protected, particularly in
light of the Lomonosov Ridge dispute and the area of the Barents Sea governed by the Norwegian-Russian treaty.
1.

Conflicting approaches: Scandinavian environmental protection
arrangements vs. Russian development expectations

The Scandinavian states favor a sustainable and precautionary approach to any new oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation in the
Arctic.64 At the international level, there is currently no regulatory instrument governing offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic,65 though all of
the Arctic states party to UNCLOS must fulfill a general obligation regarding protection and conservation of the Arctic marine environment.66 The
Scandinavian states of Denmark and Norway have demonstrated an intime commercial fisherman in this region. DEBORAH B. ROBINSON, THE SAMI OF NORTHERN
EUROPE 4, 25 (2002).
64
Denmark and Norway maintain a notably visible foreign policy presence in this regard.
See, e.g., Per Stig Møller, Foreign Minister of Denmark, Speech at the Arctic Council in
Tromsø (Apr. 29, 2009) (“We must safeguard continued sustainable development . . . .”);
Arne Walther, Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, Presentation at the National Press Club of
Japan: Norway in the Forefront for Sustainable Global Development (July 20, 2010) (“Our
policy is to safeguard Norwegian economic, environmental and security policy interests by
means of a coherent policy that integrates the three.”).
65
See TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: I. OVERVIEW AND GAP ANALYSIS
31–33 (2009) (noting that there are some limited regional and multilateral mechanisms for
such regulation, including UNCLOS, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)). While these multilateral arrangements
governing the regulation of hydrocarbon exploitation exist, not all states are parties to these
agreements; the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, and Canada, Russia, and the United
States are not parties to OSPAR. Id.
66
See Casper, supra note 12, at 845–47 (discussing the general framework for environmental protection under UNCLOS). The extent of states’ obligation to cooperate under
UNCLOS depends upon a determination of whether or not the Arctic Ocean can be considered an enclosed or semi-enclosed area and is beyond the discussion of this Note. Id.
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creased interest in cooperative protection of the Arctic marine environment
by voluntarily committing to treaties placing tighter regulations on pollution
of Arctic waters by oil and gas exploration.67 For example, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden are all party to the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)
which requires these states to:
Take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and…take the
necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects
of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to conserve ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas which have been adversely affected.68

OSPAR has both a full time Secretariat and the ability to impose
recommendations and binding decisions.69 Moreover, the Scandinavian
states party to this treaty are under obligations to apply the precautionary
principle, the polluter pays principle, best available techniques, and best
environmental practices, and utilize the latest developments in technology
to minimize negative impacts on the environment.70 In addition, OSPAR
requires these states to cooperate regarding trans-boundary pollution issues,71 and provides for an arbitration mechanism for the settling of disputes
arising under the convention.72
67
See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1072 [hereinafter OSPAR], available at http://www.ospar.org/
html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf; Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden Concerning Cooperation in
Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances, Mar. 29,
2003, 2084 U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter 1993 Agreement].
68
OSPAR, supra note 67, art. 2(1)(a).
69
Article 10 of OSPAR establishes a commission which monitors implementation of
OSPAR and makes recommendations. Id. art 10. Article 13 mandates the commission’s
ability to issue binding decisions, requiring at least a three-quarters majority vote. Id. art. 13.
70
Article 2(2)(a) of OSPAR defines the precautionary principle. Id. art. 2. This principle
requires, “preventative measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly, or indirectly, into the marine environment
may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems,
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no
conclusive evidence of a causal relationships between the inputs and effects.” Id. (emphasis
added). Under article 2(2)(b), the polluter bears the costs of pollution prevention, control,
and reduction measures. Id. Additionally, article 2(3) requires that when implementing
OSPAR, parties consider using the best available techniques and environmental practices, as
well as utilize the latest technological developments. Id.
71
Whenever pollution from one party is likely injure the interests of any other party, the
injured party can request consultation in order to reach a cooperation agreement. Id. art. 21.
72
Issues may be submitted to arbitration by any requesting party. Id. art 32(1). The award
of the arbitral tribunal is binding. Id. art. 32(10)(a).
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The Scandinavian states have further agreed to cooperate among
one another to protect the Arctic marine environment against pollution by
oil or other harmful substances which present a grave and imminent danger
to their material interests.73 The 1993 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (1993 Agreement), establishes a monitoring, investigatory, and reporting scheme that requires these states to notify one another of substantial pollution within their territorial seas, fishing
grounds, EEZs, and continental shelves, and to provide mutual assistance to
one another in the event of an emergency.74 These agreements between the
Scandinavian and Nordic states indicate a preference for a cooperative and
cautionary approach to new oil and gas development at odds with the development expectations of other members of the Arctic Five.
All members of the Arctic Five, including Russia, are party to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL 73/78), but fundamental difficulties with its implementation
may still place the Scandinavian states’ environmental interests in the Arctic
at risk.75 For example, though a Scandinavian state may report violations of
this treaty occurring outside its jurisdiction to the offending vessel’s flag
state, flag states may refuse to take action against their own vessels.76
MARPOL 73/78 applies to oil rigs as well as ships, but it does not protect
Scandinavian states from pollution by oil and gas development occurring
outside its jurisdiction.77 Such pollution may still affect the environmental
interests of Scandinavian states as outputs by offshore oil rigs of oil, water,
and gas can inject “chemical cocktails of active ingredients” into ocean
streams.78 Moreover, national governments bear the burden of investigating
and prosecuting violations of MARPOL 73/78, which may prove difficult
for Scandinavian states considering complex requirements and limited re-

73

1993 Agreement, supra note 67, art. 1.
Id. art. 2–8.
75
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78] (modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto
(MARPOL 73/78) on Feb. 17, 1978, entered into force Oct. 2, 1983).
76
See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32450, CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION:
BACKGROUND, LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND KEY ISSUES, 9 (2008) (noting that the Government Accountability Office of the United States has documented a poor response to action
taken based on such referrals by the United States).
77
See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 75. In the case of Denmark’s claim to the Lomonosov
ridge, this could have serious repercussions, as the extent of Denmark’s jurisdiction with
respect to this region is currently unknown.
78
JUAN FERNANDO CAICEDO RESTREPO, ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH
OFFSHORE PLATFORM DISCHARGES 5, available at http://www.oilandgasforum.net/manageme
nt/paperlegisl.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
74
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sources.79 Compounding these difficulties, Russia has increased shipping
traffic on the Northern Sea Route, and more ships will be taking this route
in coming years.80
Considering both the Lomonosov Ridge dispute between Denmark
and Russia, and Norway’s new agreed upon treaty with Russia, these gaps
in the existing environmental legal framework should be cause for concern.
Of particular concern is that Russia, the world’s leading exporter of oil and
natural gas, is acting aggressively to secure its interests with respect to hydrocarbon exploitation despite environmental risks.81 For example, in the
Shtokman field located in the Barents Sea near the newly delineated Norwegian-Russian boundary, Russia is hurriedly approving oil and gas drilling
without adhering to proper environmental protocol.82 In addition, Russian
scientists predict that by 2020 the exploration and development of this field
will be “critical for sustainability and further development of Russia’s oil
and gas complex and national economy,” increasing pressure on Russia to
develop and establish sovereignty in the Arctic, in places such as the Lomonosov Ridge and the Barents Sea.83 Russia is also constructing floating
nuclear power plants in order to exploit these resources, compounding the

79
See INT’L MAR. ORG., MARPOL-HOW TO DO IT: MANUAL ON THE PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF RATIFYING, IMPLEMENTING, AND ENFORCING MARPOL 73/78, 91–106
(2003) (detailing some of the difficulties with technical aspects of enforcing MARPOL
73/78, such as collecting highly evanescent evidence and the need to inspect every ship).
80
Paul Goble, Increasing Traffic on the Northern Sea Route Sparks Security Concerns in
Moscow, GEORGIAN DAILY (Oct. 21, 2010), http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=20247&Itemid=72.
81
See Owen Matthews, So Long, Salad Days, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.
newsweek.com/2010/02/23/so-long-salad-days.html (noting Russia’s past conduct with
respect to gas cutoffs to Ukraine and Europe, status as a leading energy supplier, and its
attempts to assert control over Arctic development of oil and natural gas via state-run oil
companies); see also Julia Werdigier, BP Forms Partnership to Explore in Russia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011 at B1 (describing $7.8 billion deal between Russian-owned Rosneft and
British Petroleum to exploit oil on Russia’s continental shelf as well as plans to establish an
Arctic technology center).
82
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, WWF Calls for Investigation into Russian Hydrocarbon Extraction Project (Sept. 19, 2010), http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/arctic/
news/?195030. The CEO of Statoil, a Norwegian partner in the Shtokman field has also
reportedly indicated fears of corruption regarding the project and that, “a number of other
serious challenges [exist], including lack of local infrastructure.” Statoil Sees "Serious"
Shtokman Risks-Wikileaks, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOil
News/idAFLDE70611620110107.
83
A.E. Kontorovich, et. al, Geology and Hydrocarbon Resources of the Continental Shelf
in Russian Arctic Seas and the Prospects of Their Development 51 RUSSIAN GEOLOGY &
GEOPHYSICS 10 (2010).
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environmental risks associated with drilling for oil and natural gas in this
region.84
2.

Increased obligations to indigenous peoples

The Scandinavian states have an increased obligation to respect and
integrate the wishes of their indigenous peoples into Arctic policy in comparison to the other members of the Arctic Five. For example, Denmark and
Norway are party to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and members of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).85 Article 15 of
ILO Convention 169 requires states party to allow indigenous groups to
participate in the use, management and conservation of resources and requires states to consult indigenous peoples prior to undertaking or permitting resource exploitation.86 Though UNDRIP is a United Nations General
Assembly Resolution, Article 32(2) of UNDRIP affirms that:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water, or
other resources.87

The United States and Russia are not members of either of these instruments, and Canada only recently adopted UNDRIP.88 As the treaty de84

While these floating nuclear plants are currently only being placed within Russia’s
sovereign exclusive economic zone, they have potential for use on an extended continental
shelf. Richard Galpin, The Struggle for Arctic Riches, BBC (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.bbc.
co.uk /news/world-11381773; see also Karl Grossman, Floating Chernobyls, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karl-grossman/floating-chernobyls_b_
698550.html (noting the environmental risks).
85
International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Convention C169 (Jun. 27, 1989), available at http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and Arctic Resources, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 251, 275–78 (2009) (noting that the ILO
Convention was the first legally binding recognition of indigenous rights to self-governance).
86
ILO Convention 169, supra note 85, art. 15.
87
UNDRIP, supra note 85, art. 32(2).
88
ILO Convention 169, supra note 85; UNDRIP, supra note 85. Upon adopting UNDRIP,
Canada specifically noted, “the Declaration is a non-legally binding document that does not
reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws.” Press Release, Aboriginal
Affairs & N. Dev. Can., Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/dcl/
stmt-eng.asp.
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limiting the maritime boundary line between Norway and Russia demonstrates, the rights of indigenous peoples are at risk of being disregarded by
international diplomacy when negotiating the Arctic continental shelf
boundary and trans-boundary resource management issues with states that
do not have the same obligations. Two groups in particular, the Greenland
Inuit and the Sami, reside within Scandinavian territories and will be at risk
for such neglect.
a.

Greenland Inuit

Denmark’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge stems entirely from its
connection to Greenland. After a period of colonial rule, Greenland became
a part of the Danish state in 1953.89 The Home Rule Act of 2009 now grants
Greenland autonomy over all domestic affairs, including natural resources,
but excluding defense and international affairs.90 Denmark continues to pay
subsidies to Greenland, but these payments will eventually diminish as
Greenland begins to earn revenue related to its mineral resource activities.91
In addition, the new Home Rule Act provides Greenland the opportunity to
gain independence from Denmark. However, this would require an agreement between Denmark and Greenland, ratified by referendum in Greenland
and by the Danish Folketing.92
Denmark has a significant duty to ensure that the indigenous peoples of Greenland are afforded the opportunity to participate in resource
management decisions and decisions affecting their territory.93 Greenlanders
have a demonstrated interest in developing offshore oil to sustain their local
economy, but they may be reluctant to abandon the safety net of their status
as a Danish protectorate, unless they believe their interests are not adequately being represented in the international arena.94 If Denmark has any inten89

GARTH NETTHEIM, GARY D. MEYERS & DONNA CRAIG, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 191 (2002).
90
The Home Rule Act of 2009 replaced the 1979 version. Prior to the establishment of
Home Rule in 1979, Greenland had limited involvement in its own governmental affairs.
United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. E/C.19/2009/4/Add.4 (Mar. 3, 2009).
91
Id. Annex I, Chapter 3.
92
Id. Annex I, Chapter 8.
93
See Bratspies, supra note 85, at 277 (Construing obligations under ILO 169 and
UNDRIP together).
94
See Andrew Ward & Sylvia Pfeifer, Greenland Sees Oil as Key to Independence,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ae57664-b134-11df-b89900144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz15bHHb9As (noting the tension between the desire of
Greenlanders to develop for oil and the notion that independence at the present moment
could create reliance upon oil companies in place of Denmark).
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tion of retaining sovereignty over Greenland, striving to protect the rights of
its indigenous inhabitants will be critical.
Denmark’s retention of Greenland and protection of indigenous
rights is also essential in another dispute. Canada and Denmark both claim
ownership of a tiny island, Hans Island, in the Kennedy Channel.95 Oil and
gas reserves may be present in the surrounding seabed, though it is likely
the island’s true significance lies in its relative proximity to the Northwest
Passage and the ability to regulate the entry of ships into this passage. 96
While some scholars have downplayed the significance of this island, the
two states have often made outward political demonstrations of ownership,
and have, for the time being, agreed to disagree.97 Nonetheless, Denmark’s
best argument for establishing sovereignty in this dispute is that the Greenland Inuit use the island as part of their traditional hunting grounds.98
Should these states enter negations as to the island’s ownership, Denmark is
under an obligation to include and will have a strong interest in including
the Greenland Inuit that Canada does not.99
b.

Sami people of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia

Norway is also a member of ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP.100
The Sami people, whom these instruments have been ratified to protect,
inhabit the northernmost reaches of not only Norway, but also Sweden, Finland, and Russia.101 These people rely primarily on reindeer herding;102 a
traditionally nomadic way of life vulnerable to the effects of climate change
and globalization, and interdependent upon the stability of the natural environment.103
95
MICHAEL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC? 22–24 (2009). Hans Island is the last remaining territorial based dispute in the entire Arctic. Id.
96
See Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential
Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
263, 268 (2007) (Noting the potential lucrative benefits of such regulation).
97
BYERS, supra note 95, at 28–30.
98
See id. at 24–25. (Citing statements made by Danish officials).
99
See Aboriginal Affairs & N. Dev. Can., supra note 88. Though it is party to UNDRIP,
Canada has noted the nature of this treaty as a non-binding “aspirational document” and
including the Greenland Inuit in this discussion would be directly adverse to its interests.
100
Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/relm/country.htm (last updated May 19, 2011); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th
plen. mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007).
101
NETTHEIM, MEYERS & CRAIG, supra note 89, at 209.
102
Id. (stating that reindeer herding is one principal aspect of the Sami livelihood).
103
KESKITALO, supra note 22, at 138–43 (discussing the vulnerability of reindeer herding
to a variety of factors associated with global climate change and globalization, including the
ability to adapt).
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In order to fulfill its obligations under these international documents, Norway must ensure the rights of the Sami to political participation
in resource management decisions.104 To a certain extent Norway has
sought to do so by implementing the Sami Act, which requires consultation
by all levels of the Norwegian government with the Sami Parliament in decisions affecting Sami affairs.105 However, the extent of Sami rights to dominion over natural resources is still unclear, and remains contested.106
Norway, Sweden, and Finland have established mutual cooperation with
respect to Sami issues since 2001, but Russia has not participated in such
efforts.107 Russia has done very little to ensure national political participation of Sami and other indigenous peoples of the Arctic in resource management decisions.108
States such as Russia and Canada are likely to take positions with
respect to the inclusion of indigenous groups in resource management decisions directly at odds with those of the Scandinavian states. The NorwegianRussian treaty demonstrates that bilateral negotiations regarding Arctic delimitation are insufficient to adequately incorporate the interests and rights
of indigenous peoples, and this approach should be avoided with respect to
division of the Lomonosov Ridge. Scandinavian states should seek to support and promote a stable forum for indigenous participation, with a view to
upholding ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. The Arctic Council provides

104

Bratspies, supra note 85, at 275–78 (stating that Articles 32 of UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169 both require member states to honor many indigenous rights, including those in
resource management decision on or affecting their territories).
105
NETTHEIM, MEYERS & CRAIG, supra note 89, at 217. (explaining that the Sami Act requires all national, regional and local authorities to consult with the Sami parliament before
making any decisions that may affect the Sami people). Finland and Sweden also have Sami
parliaments. Id.
106
Id. at 217–19 (summarizing the differences in recognized land ownership and natural
resource rights between the Sami and Norwegian parliaments).
107
Nordic Sami Cooperation, MINISTRY OF GOV’T ADMIN., REFORM AND CHURCH AFFAIRS,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fad/Selected-topics/Sami-policy/nordic-samicooperation.html?id=24390 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
108
See ASS’N OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE RUSS. N. AND INST. FOR ECOLOGY AND
ACTION ANTHROPOLOGY, PARALLEL INFORMATION: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS
SMALL-NUMBERED PEOPLES OF THE RUSSIAN NORTH, SIBERIA AND THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST 3–
4 (Johannes Rohr et al. eds., 2008) (noting the lack of inclusion of indigenous groups in
decision making regarding use of natural resources and the vulnerability of such groups); see
also United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, at 13–
18, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2009/4/Add.7 (Apr. 2, 2009) (generalizing minimal steps taken to
protect the rights of indigenous peoples in Russia).
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one such forum in which Scandinavian states can ensure this interest will be
protected, as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.109
3.

Denuclearization

Scandinavian interests in security are also at risk of being disregarded by the current legal framework governing the Arctic. Scandinavian
states have long demonstrated an interest in ensuring a nuclear-free Arctic
and have recently advanced support for such proposals.110 Under the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Canada, Denmark,
and Norway are committed to remain non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS),
whereas the United States and Russia are designated as nuclear weapons
states (NWS).111 This treaty obligates NNWS not to produce or receive nuclear weapons, while allowing NWS to possess them.112 Of particular relevance to this discussion is Article VI, which encourages states to develop
nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ).113
In addition to being NNWS, another reason states such as Denmark
and Norway have a particular interest in the creation of a NWFZ in the Arctic is a conscious memory of the Danish experience during the height of the
Cold War at Thule Air Base in 1968.114 This incident involved an American
B-52 bomber carrying four nuclear bombs as part of an airborne alert mission.115 A cabin fire onboard caused the bomber to crash, releasing radioactive uranium and plutonium, although the explosion itself was not nucle109

See Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/
en/about-us/permanentparticipants (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (describing the participatory
role of indigenous peoples).
110
See generally DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEARWEAPON-FREE ZONE (Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Arctic). See Torbjørn Graff Hugo, An Arctic Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone: A Norwegian Perspective, in CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPONFREE ZONE 39, 41 (Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (noting the Nordic Council suggested a
nuclear weapon free zone in the Arctic as early as 1993).
111
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] (explaining the duties and obligations of
both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states under the treaty).
112
Id. art. I, II. While allowing NWS to possess nuclear weapons, the preamble to the NPT
notes the intention of states party to, “achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” Id.
113
Id. art. VI.
114
See generally Jens Zinglersen, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic in DANISH
INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, CONFERENCE ON AN ARCTIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 113–17
(Cindy Vestergaard, ed., 2010) (describing the Danish experience with respect to the Thule
nuclear accident).
115
Id. at 114.
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ar.116 Many Danish and Thule workers involved in the massive clean-up
operation suffered radiation poisoning.117
There are several challenges to the creation of a NWFZ in the Arctic.118 For example, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and the United States are
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which includes a nuclear role as part of its strategic alliance.119 Mustering political will from
Russia and the United States to ban nuclear submarine transit will also be a
significant obstacle.120 However, the Cold War is long over and NATO and
Russia are beginning to cooperate very positively. The two recently signed a
partnership agreement, specifically stating, “the NATO nations and Russia
have, today, agreed, in writing, that while we face many security challenges,
we pose no threat to each other.”121 If there truly is no longer any perceived
security threat between the Arctic Five, then the need for nuclear weapons
in the Arctic becomes moot. Furthermore, there is no reason why NNWS
cannot begin discussion of a NWFZ at this stage.122
IV. A SCANDINAVIAN MODEL
A.

The Arctic Council

The UNCLOS dispute resolution system currently leaves the conflicting claim issue up to international diplomacy, which has the potential
for putting the interests of Scandinavian states directly at odds with other
members of the Arctic Five. To protect their interests in the environment,
the rights of their indigenous peoples, and their security concerns, the Scandinavian states should develop a comprehensive strategic approach. The
most appropriate forum in which these states will be able to pursue such an
approach is within the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council evolved as a high
level intergovernmental forum from the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protec-

116

Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 115–16.
118
See MICHAEL WALLACE & STEVEN STAPLES, RIDDING THE ARCTIC OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: A TASK LONG OVERDUE 10–14 (2010) (Identifying nuclear submarine transit by
NWS, the location of Russian naval bases, and the political position of the United States as
major obstacles to negotiating a NWFZ).
119
See North Atlantic Treaty art. 5–8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(providing for the collective defense of member states, this provision could allow NWS to
station nuclear weapons in a NNWS in the event of an armed attack).
120
WALLACE & STAPLES, supra note 118.
121
NATO-Russia Set on Path Towards Strategic Partnership, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Nov.
20, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F267F097-DC26FE3A/natolive/news_68876.htm.
122
The negotiation of a NWFZ can effectively begin piecemeal. WALLACE & STAPLES,
supra note 118, at 14–17.
117
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tion Strategy and is “the only major intergovernmental initiative for the Arctic involving all eight Arctic states.”123
The Arctic Council already includes participation for indigenous
peoples and has six working groups devoted to environmental issues.124
However, the Arctic Council lacks the ability to impose any binding environmental regulation based on its scientific studies, a permanent source of
funding, and legal status as an international organization.125 Scandinavian
states have often been footing the bill for the projects undertaken by the
Arctic Council.126 Considering the complex web of international treaties
pertaining to the Arctic, the Arctic Council is in need of a legal mandate to
avoid becoming a defunct body, and to prevent unorganized and uncoordinated approaches to oil and natural gas development as continental shelf
boundaries are negotiated and extended and the Arctic continues to melt.127
B.

Leading the Charge: Proposal

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden have announced common interests
in chairing the Arctic Council, and consecutively hold the chairmanship
until 2012.128 The Nordic Council, of which all three of these states are
members, has already recommended moving toward an expanded role for
the Arctic Council as the primary model of Arctic governance.129 In addi123

Members of the Arctic Council are: the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland. Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93
AM. J. INT’L. L. 712 (1999).
124
These working groups include: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group
(SDWG). Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php
/en/about-us/working-groups (last visited Jan. 2, 2012).
125
See Bloom, supra note 123, at 718–22 (describing these impotencies).
126
Id. at 718–19 (“Norway pays the secretariat for AMAP, Iceland for PAME, Iceland and
the United States for CAFF, and Denmark provides most of the funding for the Indigenous
Peoples’ Secretariat.”).
127
Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty: Evaluation and a New Proposal 17
REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 14, 26 (2008).
128
Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish Common Objectives for their Arctic Council Chairmanships 2006–2013, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.
php/en/about-us/chairmanship/89-resources/about.
129
See NORDIC COUNCIL, COMMITTEE PROPOSAL ON JURISPRUDENTIAL RESEARCH IN THE
MARINE AREAS IN THE NORTH AND AN ARCTIC TREATY § 6 (2006) (“The Nordic Council
recommends to the Nordic Council of Ministers that efforts be made, in co-operation with
the Arctic Council, to establish an Arctic treaty.”), available at http://www.norden.org/en/
nordic-council/cases/a-1392-medborger. The Nordic Council is an inter-parliamentary union
and also includes Finland, Iceland and the territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the
Åland Islands. In 2006 it proposed, “The Nordic Council recommends to the Nordic Council
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tion, these states have already taken the initiative to make the financial resources available for a permanent secretariat until the end of 2012.130
The inclusion of Scandinavian interests in environmental protection, indigenous rights, and security in a proposal regarding the Arctic is
key for several reasons. The Scandinavian states have much to contribute to
informing sound policy for managing Arctic resources. For example, implementing the Scandinavian approach to sustainable development under
agreements such as OSPAR and the 1993 Agreement can serve as a balancing mechanism to offset aggressive hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. Ensuring the enforcement of precautionary measures and promoting a
sustainable development approach in the Arctic is of interest to states outside the Arctic Five as well.131
The international community also has an interest in the inclusion of
the rights of indigenous groups in resource management decisions. Supporting the incorporation of traditional knowledge of indigenous groups into
resource management policies may help slow the effects of global climate
change.132 In addition, preserving the livelihoods of indigenous groups such
as the Greenland Inuit and Sami are essential to enriching the world’s cultural diversity.133
Scandinavian states can also lead the discussion of Arctic denuclearization. Danish and Norwegian membership in NATO as well as the Danish experience at Thule air base can assist in providing the political will
necessary for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Arctic. The creation of a
NWFZ in the Arctic will assist NWS in rising to the challenge set forth by

of Ministers that efforts be made, in co-operation with the Arctic Council, to establish an
Arctic treaty.” Nordic Council, NORDEN, http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council (last
visited Jan. 2, 2012).
130
See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 128.
131
See Neva Collins, Environment, in U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 95–97, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No. 09.VI.13
(2009) (summarizing the impacts of global climate change upon the environment and the
world’s indigenous peoples).
132
See id. at 94, 102, 115 (noting the important role traditional knowledge of biodiversity
can play and recognition of indigenous groups in sustainable development by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation); see also KESKITALO, supra note 22, at 104–07 (discussing
mechanization of reindeer herding).
133
Despite being a numerical minority, indigenous groups speak a majority of the world’s
languages and are in danger of extinction. See Naomi Kipuri, Culture, in U.N. DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 57–67, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No. 09.VI.13 (2009) (acknowledging the value of indigenous language, spiritual belief systems, social institutions, and traditional knowledge in enriching the
world’s culture).
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the NPT to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and provide a more secure,
transparent, and accountable environment for the entire globe.134
A lack of political will from other members of the Arctic Council
may inhibit the creation of any type of binding treaty framework to govern
the Arctic, but strengthening the capacity of the Arctic Council to address
the issues it already deals with is not beyond the scope of viability. 135 Moreover, enhancing the capacity of the Arctic Council provides the distinct advantages of: formalizing and integrating an already existing web of treaties;
a short time frame; low cost; and manageable structural changes, which can
assist in developing the consensus needed for this initiative. In addition,
indigenous groups could retain their status as permanent participants within
the working groups of the Council, ensuring that their consultation continues to play an important role in decision making about resource management.
The Scandinavian states should lead the Arctic Council to establish
a working group designed specifically to audit and consider proposals for a
comprehensive Arctic treaty, that have already been made by observers
within the Arctic Council.136 The Scandinavian states should lead this push
to protect their interests in the Arctic, as they are directly involved in regions where the potential for conflicting resource management strategies to
develop is high, such as the Lomonosov Ridge and the Barents Sea.137 Any
treaty proposal should not seek to supplant the work of other international
treaties such as UNCLOS, OSPAR, the 1993 Agreement between Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, or MARPOL 73/78, but rather, to
harmonize these approaches to regulating oil and natural gas exploration
and development on the extended continental shelves.
Drawing upon OSPAR, an Arctic treaty should at minimum require
states to implement the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle,
and to utilize best available techniques, best environmental practices, and
134

NPT, supra note 111 (The preamble to the NPT was written in the spirit of “desiring to
further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in
order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all
their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and
the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.”).
135
See Oran Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North
45 POLAR RECORD 73, 79–81 (2009) (suggesting that a lack of political will inhibit the Arctic
Council from transitioning into a formal regulatory organization).
136
See Koivurova, supra note 127, at 23 (discussing such proposals made by WWF Arctic,
Linda Nowlan, and Rosemary Rayfuse).
137
See generally supra Part III.A (describing the potential for conflict in the Lomonosov
region and the Barents Sea). See KOIVUROVA & MOLENAAR, supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting the conflicting obligations of states party to UNCLOS and OSPAR with
respect to hydrocarbon exploitation).
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the latest developments in technology to minimize negative impacts on the
environment.138 A mechanism for resolving disputes arising under the treaty
regarding the application of these principles must be clearly designated and
agreed to by all parties. In order to avoid technical problems, such as those
encountered with the enforcement of MARPOL 73/78,139 an Arctic a treaty
should also include a monitoring, investigatory, and reporting regime modeled after that of the 1993 Agreement, providing for mutual assistance and
protocols for emergency disaster response.140 Such provisions serve to ensure the sustainable development of Arctic resources in a manner consistent
with the current Scandinavian approach.
An Arctic Treaty that formalizes the current Arctic Council into a
formal international organization with a legal mandate is a proposal that
may be well suited to Scandinavian interests, as the Arctic Council already
includes participation for indigenous groups. Whether or not such a proposal is adopted, the Arctic treaty working group should invite the participation of indigenous groups as permanent participants. Consistent with ILO
Convention 169 and UNDRIP, an Arctic treaty should involve indigenous
groups in drafting and provide for their consultation on decisions regarding
international resource management.141 Finally, alongside the Arctic treaty
working group, a specific working group should be designated to facilitate
openness and dialogue as to the development of a NWFZ, in accordance
with obligations under the NPT and the North Atlantic Treaty.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note stops just short of suggesting the appropriate treaty regime for Arctic governance. However, the Arctic Council is more than sufficiently equipped at this time to establish a working group to begin discussion of such a treaty. What remains to be seen is which states will take the
initiative to do so.
The UNCLOS continental shelf delimitation framework leaves the
resolution of disputes up to international diplomacy. The interests of Scandinavian states in environmental resource management, indigenous inclusion, and security are at risk for neglect and exploitation in both the Lomonosov Ridge dispute and the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation
138

See supra note 70 and accompanying text (defining these principles).
See supra Part III.B.1 (noting the technical difficulties associated with enforcement of
MARPOL 73/78).
140
1993 Agreement, supra note 67, art. 2–8.
141
ILO Convention 169, supra note 85, art. 15 (requiring the rights of these indigenous and
tribal peoples to be specially safeguarded and requiring that “governments shall establish or
maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples . . . .”); UNDRIP, supra
note 85, art. 32.2 (requiring states to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned . . . .”).
139
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treaty. As pressure to develop the Arctic’s resources mount, conflicting development strategies between the Arctic Five threaten a sustainable and
precautionary approach to natural resource exploitation. Scandinavian indigenous groups, while included in the Arctic Council and Scandinavian
governments, face exclusion from natural resource management decisions in
the Arctic that directly influence their livelihood and survival. Finally, the
security interests of the Arctic Five are not at odds, and the creation of a
NWFZ is long overdue.
Considering the gaps in the current legal framework governing the
Arctic, Scandinavian states have a strong incentive to lead the way toward
the creation of a comprehensive multilateral Arctic treaty. Such a treaty
could provide Scandinavian states with a mechanism for ensuring a sustainable approach to Arctic resource management, honoring the rights of their
respective indigenous groups, and achieving denuclearization of the Arctic.
Because UNCLOS ultimately leaves the resolution of conflicting continental shelf claims up to international diplomacy, Scandinavian states must
develop a strategic approach to ensure these national interests are protected
and that this important region does not devolve into a lawless frontier. The
best route to resolving Arctic sovereignty, from a Scandinavian perspective,
is the creation of a working group within the Arctic Council to consider
proposals for an Arctic treaty.

